Activation key x plane crack software

ISSUE SUMMARY
On Sunday 2 June, 2019, Google Cloud projects running services in multiple US regions experienced elevated packet loss as a result of network congestion for a duration of between 3 hours 19 minutes, and 4 hours 25 minutes. The duration and degree of packet loss varied considerably from region to region and is explained in detail below. Other Google Cloud services which depend on Google's US network were also impacted, as were several non-Cloud Google services which could not fully redirect users to unaffected regions. Customers may have experienced increased latency, intermittent errors, and connectivity loss to instances in us-central1, us-east1, us-east4, us-west2, northamerica-northeast1, and southamerica-east1. Google Cloud instances in us-west1, and all European regions and Asian regions, did not experience regional network congestion.
Google Cloud Platform services were affected until mitigation completed for each region, including: Google Compute Engine, App Engine, Cloud Endpoints, Cloud Interconnect, Cloud VPN, Cloud Console, Stackdriver Metrics, Cloud Pub/Sub, Bigquery, regional Cloud Spanner instances, and Cloud Storage regional buckets. G Suite services in these regions were also affected.
We apologize to our customers whose services or businesses were impacted during this incident, and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. A detailed assessment of impact is at the end of this report.
ROOT CAUSE AND REMEDIATION
This was a major outage, both in its scope and duration. As is always the case in such instances, multiple failures combined to amplify the impact.
Within any single physical datacenter location, Google's machines are segregated into multiple logical clusters which have their own dedicated cluster management software, providing resilience to failure of any individual cluster manager. Google's network control plane runs under the control of different instances of the same cluster management software; in any single location, again, multiple instances of that cluster management software are used, so that failure of any individual instance has no impact on network capacity.
Google's cluster management software plays a significant role in automating datacenter maintenance events, like power infrastructure changes or network augmentation. Google's scale means that maintenance events are globally common, although rare in any single location. Jobs run by the cluster management software are labelled with an indication of how they should behave in the face of such an event: typically jobs are either moved to a machine which is not under maintenance, or stopped and rescheduled after the event.
Two normally-benign misconfigurations, and a specific software bug, combined to initiate the outage: firstly, network control plane jobs and their supporting infrastructure in the impacted regions were configured to be stopped in the face of a maintenance event. Secondly, the multiple instances of cluster management software running the network control plane were marked as eligible for inclusion in a particular, relatively rare maintenance event type. Thirdly, the software initiating maintenance events had a specific bug, allowing it to deschedule multiple independent software clusters at once, crucially even if those clusters were in different physical locations.
The outage progressed as follows: at 11:45 US/Pacific, the previously-mentioned maintenance event started in a single physical location; the automation software created a list of jobs to deschedule in that physical location, which included the logical clusters running network control jobs. Those logical clusters also included network control jobs in other physical locations. The automation then descheduled each in-scope logical cluster, including the network control jobs and their supporting infrastructure in multiple physical locations.
Google's resilience strategy relies on the principle of defense in depth. Specifically, despite the network control infrastructure being designed to be highly resilient, the network is designed to 'fail static' and run for a period of time without the control plane being present as an additional line of defense against failure. The network ran normally for a short period - several minutes - after the control plane had been descheduled. After this period, BGP routing between specific impacted physical locations was withdrawn, resulting in the significant reduction in network capacity observed by our services and users, and the inaccessibility of some Google Cloud regions. End-user impact began to be seen in the period 11:47-11:49 US/Pacific.
Google engineers were alerted to the failure two minutes after it began, and rapidly engaged the incident management protocols used for the most significant of production incidents. Debugging the problem was significantly hampered by failure of tools competing over use of the now-congested network. The defense in depth philosophy means we have robust backup plans for handling failure of such tools, but use of these backup plans (including engineers travelling to secure facilities designed to withstand the most catastrophic failures, and a reduction in priority of less critical network traffic classes to reduce congestion) added to the time spent debugging. Furthermore, the scope and scale of the outage, and collateral damage to tooling as a result of network congestion, made it initially difficult to precisely identify impact and communicate accurately with customers.
As of 13:01 US/Pacific, the incident had been root-caused, and engineers halted the automation software responsible for the maintenance event. We then set about re-enabling the network control plane and its supporting infrastructure. Additional problems once again extended the recovery time: with all instances of the network control plane descheduled in several locations, configuration data had been lost and needed to be rebuilt and redistributed. Doing this during such a significant network configuration event, for multiple locations, proved to be time-consuming. The new configuration began to roll out at 14:03.
In parallel with these efforts, multiple teams within Google applied mitigations specific to their services, directing traffic away from the affected regions to allow continued serving from elsewhere.
As the network control plane was rescheduled in each location, and the relevant configuration was recreated and distributed, network capacity began to come back online. Recovery of network capacity started at 15:19, and full service was resumed at 16:10 US/Pacific time.
The multiple concurrent failures which contributed to the initiation of the outage, and the prolonged duration, are the focus of a significant post-mortem process at Google which is designed to eliminate not just these specific issues, but the entire class of similar problems. Full details follow in the Prevention and Follow-Up section.
PREVENTION AND FOLLOW-UP
We have immediately halted the datacenter automation software which deschedules jobs in the face of maintenance events. We will re-enable this software only when we have ensured the appropriate safeguards are in place to avoid descheduling of jobs in multiple physical locations concurrently. Further, we will harden Google's cluster management software such that it rejects such requests regardless of origin, providing an additional layer of defense in depth and eliminating other similar classes of failure.
Google's network control plane software and supporting infrastructure will be reconfigured such that it handles datacenter maintenance events correctly, by rejecting maintenance requests of the type implicated in this incident. Furthermore, the network control plane in any single location will be modified to persist its configuration so that the configuration does not need to be rebuilt and redistributed in the event of all jobs being descheduled. This will reduce recovery time by an order of magnitude. Finally, Google's network will be updated to continue in 'fail static' mode for a longer period in the event of loss of the control plane, to allow an adequate window for recovery with no user impact.
Google's emergency response tooling and procedures will be reviewed, updated and tested to ensure that they are robust to network failures of this kind, including our tooling for communicating with the customer base. Furthermore, we will extend our continuous disaster recovery testing regime to include this and other similarly catastrophic failures.
Our post-mortem process will be thorough and broad, and remains at a relatively early stage. Further action items may be identified as this process progresses.

ISSUE SUMMARY
On Sunday 2 June, 2019, Google Cloud projects running services in multiple US regions experienced elevated packet loss as a result of network congestion for a duration of between 3 hours 19 minutes, and 4 hours 25 minutes. The duration and degree of packet loss varied considerably from region to region and is explained in detail below. Other Google Cloud services which depend on Google's US network were also impacted, as were several non-Cloud Google services which could not fully redirect users to unaffected regions. Customers may have experienced increased latency, intermittent errors, and connectivity loss to instances in us-central1, us-east1, us-east4, us-west2, northamerica-northeast1, and southamerica-east1. Google Cloud instances in us-west1, and all European regions and Asian regions, did not experience regional network congestion.
Google Cloud Platform services were affected until mitigation completed for each region, including: Google Compute Engine, App Engine, Cloud Endpoints, Cloud Interconnect, Cloud VPN, Cloud Console, Stackdriver Metrics, Cloud Pub/Sub, Bigquery, regional Cloud Spanner instances, and Cloud Storage regional buckets. G Suite services in these regions were also affected.
We apologize to our customers whose services or businesses were impacted during this incident, and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. A detailed assessment of impact is at the end of this report.
ROOT CAUSE AND REMEDIATION
This was a major outage, both in its scope and duration. As is always the case in such instances, multiple failures combined to amplify the impact.
Within any single physical datacenter location, Google's machines are segregated into multiple logical clusters which have their own dedicated cluster management software, providing resilience to failure of any individual cluster manager. Google's network control plane runs under the control of different instances of the same cluster management software; in any single location, again, multiple instances of that cluster management software are used, so that failure of any individual instance has no impact on network capacity.
Google's cluster management software plays a significant role in automating datacenter maintenance events, like power infrastructure changes or network augmentation. Google's scale means that maintenance events are globally common, although rare in any single location. Jobs run by the cluster management software are labelled with an indication of how they should behave in the face of such an event: typically jobs are either moved to a machine which is not under maintenance, or stopped and rescheduled after the event.
Two normally-benign misconfigurations, and a specific software bug, combined to initiate the outage: firstly, network control plane jobs and their supporting infrastructure in the impacted regions were configured to be stopped in the face of a maintenance event. Secondly, the multiple instances of cluster management software running the network control plane were marked as eligible for inclusion in a particular, relatively rare maintenance event type. Thirdly, the software initiating maintenance events had a specific bug, allowing it to deschedule multiple independent software clusters at once, crucially even if those clusters were in different physical locations.
The outage progressed as follows: at 11:45 US/Pacific, the previously-mentioned maintenance event started in a single physical location; the automation software created a list of jobs to deschedule in that physical location, which included the logical clusters running network control jobs. Those logical clusters also included network control jobs in other physical locations. The automation then descheduled each in-scope logical cluster, including the network control jobs and their supporting infrastructure in multiple physical locations.
Google's resilience strategy relies on the principle of defense in depth. Specifically, despite the network control infrastructure being designed to be highly resilient, the network is designed to 'fail static' and run for a period of time without the control plane being present as an additional line of defense against failure. The network ran normally for a short period - several minutes - after the control plane had been descheduled. After this period, BGP routing between specific impacted physical locations was withdrawn, resulting in the significant reduction in network capacity observed by our services and users, and the inaccessibility of some Google Cloud regions. End-user impact began to be seen in the period 11:47-11:49 US/Pacific.
Google engineers were alerted to the failure two minutes after it began, and rapidly engaged the incident management protocols used for the most significant of production incidents. Debugging the problem was significantly hampered by failure of tools competing over use of the now-congested network. The defense in depth philosophy means we have robust backup plans for handling failure of such tools, but use of these backup plans (including engineers travelling to secure facilities designed to withstand the most catastrophic failures, and a reduction in priority of less critical network traffic classes to reduce congestion) added to the time spent debugging. Furthermore, the scope and scale of the outage, and collateral damage to tooling as a result of network congestion, made it initially difficult to precisely identify impact and communicate accurately with customers.
As of 13:01 US/Pacific, the incident had been root-caused, and engineers halted the automation software responsible for the maintenance event. We then set about re-enabling the network control plane and its supporting infrastructure. Additional problems once again extended the recovery time: with all instances of the network control plane descheduled in several locations, configuration data had been lost and needed to be rebuilt and redistributed. Doing this during such a significant network configuration event, for multiple locations, proved to be time-consuming. The new configuration began to roll out at 14:03.
In parallel with these efforts, multiple teams within Google applied mitigations specific to their services, directing traffic away from the affected regions to allow continued serving from elsewhere.
As the network control plane was rescheduled in each location, and the relevant configuration was recreated and distributed, network capacity began to come back online. Recovery of network capacity started at 15:19, and full service was resumed at 16:10 US/Pacific time.
The multiple concurrent failures which contributed to the initiation of the outage, and the prolonged duration, are the focus of a significant post-mortem process at Google which is designed to eliminate not just these specific issues, but the entire class of similar problems. Full details follow in the Prevention and Follow-Up section.
PREVENTION AND FOLLOW-UP
We have immediately halted the datacenter automation software which deschedules jobs in the face of maintenance events. We will re-enable this software only when we have ensured the appropriate safeguards are in place to avoid descheduling of jobs in multiple physical locations concurrently. Further, we will harden Google's cluster management software such that it rejects such requests regardless of origin, providing an additional layer of defense in depth and eliminating other similar classes of failure.
Google's network control plane software and supporting infrastructure will be reconfigured such that it handles datacenter maintenance events correctly, by rejecting maintenance requests of the type implicated in this incident. Furthermore, the network control plane in any single location will be modified to persist its configuration so that the configuration does not need to be rebuilt and redistributed in the event of all jobs being descheduled. This will reduce recovery time by an order of magnitude. Finally, Google's network will be updated to continue in 'fail static' mode for a longer period in the event of loss of the control plane, to allow an adequate window for recovery with no user impact.
Google's emergency response tooling and procedures will be reviewed, updated and tested to ensure that they are robust to network failures of this kind, including our tooling for communicating with the customer base. Furthermore, we will extend our continuous disaster recovery testing regime to include this and other similarly catastrophic failures.
Our post-mortem process will be thorough and broad, and remains at a relatively early stage. Further action items may be identified as this process progresses.